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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Cody James Fortin appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon 
the jury verdict finding riim guilty of aggravated battery and the deadly weapon 
sentencing enhancement. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Late at night, Cody Fortin, Darryl Shaylor, and several other individuals 
gathered at a Boise house. (5/17/10 Tr., p.2, L.7 - p.7, L.19.) Fortin began 
arguing with one of the people in the house, and pointed at and "challenged" 
several others. (5/17/10 Tr., p.7, L.20 - p.9, L.10.) When Shaylor stood up to 
respond to Fortin, Fortin swung at Shaylor, and a fight ensued. (5/17/10 Tr., p.9, 
L.11 - p.11, L.2.) On the floor of the living room of the residence, Fortin bit 
Shaylor and tried to gouge his eyes. (5/17/10 Tr., p.10, L.21 - p.11, L.22.) 
Shaylor responded with bites and punches. (5/17/10 Tr., p.11, L.16 - p.12, 
L.13.) Shaylor then escaped the house, and laid down in the front yard. (5/17/10 
Tr., p.12, Ls.16-21.) At this point, Shaylor realized he was bleeding and seriously 
injured. (5/17/10 Tr., p.12, L.18 - p.13, L.21.) Fortin followed Shaylor outside, 
approached, cut Shaylor's face with a knife, and fled the scene. (5/17/10 Tr., 
p.17, L.24 - p.19, L.B.) 
The first responding officer noted a large laceration on the right side of 
Shaylor's face, from which Shaylor was bleeding profusely. (5/18/10 Tr., p.130, 
Ls.16-23.) Shaylor had coagulated blood in his hair, and was wearing a tank top 
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that was covered in blood. (Id.) The officer lifted Shaylor's shirt to reveal a pool 
of blood surrounding his upper torso. (5/18/10 Tr., p.131, Ls.4-22.) Fortin was 
transported to the hospital, was designated as a Level 1 trauma patient, and was 
treated by a trauma surgeon. (5/18/10 Tr., p.156, L.20 - p.175, L.12.) The 
surgeon identified a deep, four-inch penetrating wound between the chest and 
shoulder, near the neck, consistent with a knife wound, and a large laceration on 
the side of his face. (5/18/10 Tr., p.168, L.10 - p.171, L.19.) Shaylor had 
extremely low blood pressure, was in Class IV hemorrhagic shock, and had lost a 
significant amount of blood, but eventually recovered after emergency surgery. 
(5/18/10Tr., p.162, L.9-p.175, L.12.) 
A warrant was issued for Fortin's arrest. (5/19/10 Tr., p.39, Ls.5-10.) The 
day after the stabbing, officers located and surrounded Fortin outside of a 
Meridian residence. (5/18/10 Tr., p.208, Ls.5-11; 5/19/10 Tr., p.39, L.2 - p.41, 
L.11.) The officers were in undercover vehicles, and were wearing civilian 
clothing, but they displayed police badges, identified themselves as police 
officers, utilized the patrol lights on their undercover vehicles, and told Fortin he 
was under arrest. (5/19/10 Tr., p.41, L.12- p.47, L.19.) Fortin fled in his vehicle. 
(5/19/10 Tr., p.50, Ls.7-14.) Officers pursued him for approximately eight and 
one-half miles. (5/19/10 Tr., p.52, Ls.13-16.) During the pursuit, Fortin hit a 
police officer with his vehicle, sideswiped another vehicle, and eventually 
crashed his own vehicle. (5/18/10 Tr., p.208, L.23 - p.209, L.23.) Fortin then 
fled on foot into a wooded area, over a fence, and then into a ditch. (5/19/10 Tr., 
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p.53, L.18 - p.54, L.5.) Eventually, officers sent in a police K-9, and Fortin 
surrendered. (5/18/10 Tr., p.209, Ls.2-17.) 
The state charged Fortin with aggravated battery, the deadly weapon 
sentencing enhancement, felony eluding, and aggravated battery on a law 
enforcement officer. (UPSI, pp.4-5; R., pp.22-23; 5/18/10 Tr., p.209, Ls.18-23, 
p.210, Ls.20-22.) The state tried the aggravated battery and deadly weapon 
sentencing enhancement separately from the felony eluding and aggravated 
battery on a law enforcement officer charges. (R., pp.22-23; see generally 
5/17/10 Tr.; 5/18/10 Tr.; 5/19/10 Tr.) 
The jury found Fortin guilty of aggravated battery and the deadly weapon 
sentencing enhancement. 1 (R., p.69.) The district court sentenced Fortin to 12 
years fixed and 13 years indeterminate. (R., pp.79-82.) Fortin timely appealed. 
(R., pp.83-86.) 
1 The felony eluding and aggravated battery on a law enforcement charges were 
still pending at the time of Fortin's convictions for aggravated battery and the 
deadly weapon sentencing enhancement. (UPSI, pp.4-5.) 
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ISSUES 
Fortin states the issues on appeal as: 
1. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING 
EVIDENCE OF MR. FORTI N'S FLIGHT 
2. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO 
ALLOW THE DEFENSE TO CALL A WITNESS 
3. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED BY DENYING THE 
MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL 
4. WHETHER THE DOCTRINE OF CUMULATIVE ERROR 
REQUIRES REVERSAL 
(Appellant's brief, p.5 (capitalization in original).) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Fortin failed to show the district court abused its discretion in 
admitting evidence of his flight from police? 
2. Has Fortin failed to show the district court abused its discretion in 
excluding potential defense witness Candice Waters? 
3. Has Fortin failed to show the district court erred in denying his motion for a 
mistrial? 
4. Has Fortin failed to show that there was more than one preserved error to 
cumulate? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Fortin Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Admitting 
Evidence Of Fight 
A. Introduction 
Fortin contends the district court abused its discretion by admitting 
evidence that Fortin fled from police. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-14.) Specifically, 
Fortin contends the district court erred by failing to recognize that evidence of 
flight was subject to I.R.E. 404(b), and by failing to perform the proper analysis in 
considering the admissibility of this evidence. (Id.) 
However, while the district court did not specifically recognize the 
applicability of l.R.E. 404(b) on the record, Fortin has failed to show that the trial 
court abused its discretion in ultimately admitting the evidence. The state 
provided sufficient pretrial notice of its intent to present the evidence. The trial 
court properly analyzed the relevancy of the evidence. Further, while the trial 
court did not expressly discuss, on the record, whether the probative value of the 
evidence was substantially outweighed by any potential for unfair prejudice, the 
record indicates that the district court conducted such an analysis, and discussed 
the matter with the parties in chambers. In any event, the evidence of Fortin's 
flight was substantially probative of his consciousness of guilt, and Fortin has not 
identified any unfair prejudice to weigh against the probative value of the 
evidence. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
Rulings under I.R.E. 404(b) are reviewed under a bifurcated standard: 
whether the evidence is admissible for a purpose other than propensity is given 
free review while the determination of whether the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 
1185, 1187 (2009). 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion To Admit Evidence Of 
Fortin's Flight From Police 
Evidence of crimes or other acts bearing on a defendant's character is not 
admissible to show that the defendant acted in conformity therewith in committing 
a crime. I.R.E. 404(b). However, evidence of such crimes or acts is admissible 
if: (a) it is relevant to prove some issue other than the defendant's character, and 
(b) its probative value for the proper purpose is not substantially outweighed by 
the probability of unfair prejudice associated with character. I.R.E. 404(b); State 
v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 670, 978 P.2d 227, 230 (1999). 
A defendant's escape or flight is one of the exceptions to the general rule 
prohibiting evidence of prior bad acts or crimes. State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 
818,821,215 P.3d 538, 541 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing State v. Gootz, 110 Idaho 
807, 814, 718 P.2d 1245, 1252 (Ct. App. 1986)). Evidence of escape or flight 
may be admissible because it may indicate a consciousness of guilt. Rossignol, 
147 fdaho at 821,215 P.3d at 541. 
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Admission of evidence which is probative on the issue of flight to avoid 
prosecution requires the trial court to conduct a two-part analysis. kl at 822, 214 
P.3d at 542. The trial court must determine that the evidence is relevant under 
I.RE. 401, and then must determine that the probative value of the evidence is 
not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. ll;l Evidence is 
not unfairly prejudicial simply because it is damaging to a defendant's case. 
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it suggests decision on an improper basis. 
State v. Pokorney, 149 Idaho 459,465, 235 P.3d 409, 415 (Ct. App. 2010); State 
v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 819, 965 P.2d 174, 179 (1998). 
While the inference of guilt from a defendant's flight may be weakened 
when a defendant harbors motives for escape other than guilt of the charged 
offense, the "existence of alternative reasons for the escape goes to the weight 
of the evidence and not to its admissibility." Rossignol, 147 Idaho at 822, 215 
P.3d at 542 (citing State v. Jeffers, 661 P.2d 1105, 1116 (Ariz. 1983)). 
Prior to trial, the state filed a notice of intent to utilize I.RE. 404(b) 
evidence that Fortin had fled from officers who approached him and informed him 
he was under arrest. (R, pp.30-31.) Fortin objected to the admission of this 
evidence. (5/18/10 Tr., p.206, L.6 - p.207, L.7.) Prior to the start of the trial, the 
district court and the parties discussed the issue "at some length" in chambers. 
(5/18/10 Tr., p.220, Ls.7-11.) During the second day of trial, before the state 
presented the flight evidence to the jury, the parties discussed the matter on the 
record outside the presence of the jury. (5/18/10 Tr., p.194, L.18-p.229, L.14.) 
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At that time, the state clarified that it did not intend to introduce evidence 
that Fortin used his vehicle to strike a police officer and sideswipe another 
vehicle, or evidence of how fast Fortin was traveling while fleeing the police. 
(5/18/10 Tr., p.209, L.18 - p.210, L.4.) The trial court further excluded, as 
irrelevant, evidence emphasizing the officers' response to Fortin's flight, including 
that the officers utilized a police K-9 to assist in extracting Fortin from the ditch. 
(5/18/10 Tr., p.225, L.2 - p.229, L.6.) Subject to these exclusions, the district 
court permitted the state to introduce evidence of Fortin's flight. (5/18/10 Tr., 
p.228, L.16 - p.229, L.6.) Fortin does not challenge the district court's relevancy 
determinations on appeal. 
While the district court recognized that evidence of a defendant's flight 
from prosecution is generally admissible for the purpose of showing 
consciousness of guilt, it indicated that it "didn't think it was a[n) [I.R.E.J 404(b) 
problem."2 (5/18/10 Tr., p.222, Ls.15-22.) Fortin contends that the district court's 
failure to recognize flight as I.R.E. 404(b) evidence prevented the court from 
conducting the second prong of the flight evidence analysis - determining 
2 The concept of defendant flight evidence as being relevant to show 
consciousness of guilt is so ingrained in Idaho law that the Idaho appellate courts 
typically discuss the admissibility of such evidence without specific reference to 
I.R.E. 404(b) (Rossignol, 147 Idaho at 821-823, 215 P.3d at 541-543; Gootz, 110 
Idaho at 814-815, 718 P.2d at 1252-1253; Moore, 131 Idaho at 819-820, 965 
P.2d at 179-180). Instead, the Courts proceed directly to the two-part test for 
admissibility of flight evidence - whether the evidence is relevant under I.R. E. 
401, and whether the probative value of the evidence is not substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In light of the existence of this test, 
specific reference to or identification of I.R.E. 404(b) is inconsequential. 
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whether the probative value of the evidence of flight was substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-14.) 
Fortin's argument fails for two reasons. First, comments by the district 
court and prosecutor indicate that the district court did consider the probative 
value of the evidence in relation to the danger of unfair prejudice, and verbalized 
this analysis in chambers in the presence of the parties prior to the trial. Fortin 
thus cannot meet his burden of showing that the district court erred in failing to 
perform this analysis. Second, regardless of whether the district court expressly 
verbalized its analysis and conclusion regarding the second prong of the flight 
evidence admissibility analysis, the evidence was substantially probative of 
consciousness of guilt, and Fortin failed to identify any unfair prejudice to weigh. 
Fortin can therefore not show that the district court abused its discretion by 
ultimately admitting the evidence. 
Prior to ruling that evidence of Fortin's flight was admissible, the district 
court noted that the court and the parties had discussed the issue "at some 
length" in chambers before the trial began, and that the court indicated to the 
parties at that time that it was inclined to rule that the flight evidence was 
admissible. (5/18/10 Tr., p.220, L. 7 - p.222, L.1.) The state referenced this 
pretrial discussion while arguing in favor of the admissibility of the flight evidence. 
(5/18/10 Tr., p.219, L.1 - p.220, L.6.) The prosecutor stated: 
As I pointed out yesterday, I think [the flight evidence] falls squarely 
under the rules, I think it is 104, the Idaho Rule of Evidence states 
that evidence that is relevant comes in unless it is otherwise 
excluded by a rule. This could potentially be excluded by 403 as 
well as 404(b). And I have filed this motion so that we have notice 
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under 404(b). And so that is not an issue of notice, it is just an 
issue for the Court to decide how relevant and how much the 
prejudicial effect is. 
And certainly in this case, when the events are so closely - it 
happens one day later and they are serving the arrest warrant on 
this case when he flees from them the following day. So I think it is 
highly relevant. 
As far as whether it is prejudicial, the Court pointed out, and 
I agree, it is prejudicial but it is not unfair prejudice. It is not that 
they are going to think he did it for the wrong - for some bad 
reason or something unrelated. It is prejudicial because he was 
running from officers and shows his consciousness of guilt. 
(5/18/10 Tr., p.219, L.1 - p.220, L.6 (emphasis added).) 
The state thus not only argued that the flight evidence had no potential for 
unfair prejudice, it indicated that the district court expressed its agreement in the 
pretrial chambers meeting on the issue. Neither the district court nor Fortin 
contradicted the prosecutor's version of events. At the pretrial chambers 
meeting, the court advised Fortin that, though it was inclined to admit the 
testimony, it would consider any subsequent authority or argument presented by 
Fortin. (5/18/10 Tr., p.220, Ls.12-17.) Fortin did not produce any such authority 
or argument (5/18/10 Tr., p.220, Ls.18-23), and did not otherwise argue below 
that the district court failed to perform the second prong of the flight evidence 
analysis. Fortin cannot show that the district court failed to conduct a proper 
analysis in admitting the flight evidence. 
In any event, the flight evidence was clearly probative of Fortin's 
consciousness of guilt, and Fortin has failed to identify any unfair prejudice from 
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the evidence. Recently, in State v. Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868, _, 264 P.3d 975, 
977 (Ct. App. 2011 ), the Idaho Court of Appeals held that even where a district 
court fails to specifically address, on the record, whether the probative value of 
evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice as part of 
an I .R.E. 403 analysis, an appellant must still identify some actual unfair 
prejudice to weigh in order to show reversible error. 
In the present case, Fortin has not specifically identified any "unfair 
prejudice" from the flight evidence. (Appellant's brief, pp.12-14.) Fortin did 
contend, in the context of arguing that the state's evidence did not even implicate 
flight, that there were potential motives for his escape other than guilt of the 
aggravated battery offense - specifically, that Fortin may not have realized that 
the men who approached and pursued him were police officers, and might have 
instead thought that they were civilians seeking revenge on behalf of Shaylor for 
the incident the night before. (Appellant's brief, pp.7-9; 5/18/10 Tr., p.214, L.24-
p.215, L.20.) 
Even if Fortin had specifically identified these alternative motives as 
creating the potential for unfair prejudice, the "existence of alternative reasons for 
the escape goes to the weight of the evidence and not to its admissibility." 
Rossignol, 147 Idaho at 821, 215 P.3d at 541. Since such "alternative reasons" 
do not go to the admissibility of flight evidence, it follows that they also do not 
constitute "unfair prejudice" within the meaning of the I.R.E. 404(b) flight 
evidence admissibility analysis. Fortin was entitled to argue that Fortin's flight did 
not exhibit consciousness of guilt, and that he had alternative reasons for fleeing, 
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and he in fact did so during closing argument. (5/19/10 Tr., p.155, L.22 - p.156, 
L.20.) Fortin, however, has failed to identify any unfair prejudice from the 
evidence. 
Fortin has failed to show the district court performed an incorrect analysis 
in evaluating the admissibility of the evidence of Fortin's flight, and in any event, 
cannot show that the probative value of the evidence was substantially 
outweighed by any potential for unfair prejudice. Therefore, Fortin has failed to 
show that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence. 
I l. 
Fortin Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Excluding 
Potential Defense Witness Candice Waters 
A Introduction 
Fortin contends the district court abused its discretion in declining to allow 
potential defense witness Candice Waters to testify. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-21.) 
However, Fortin's claim fails because the record reveals that the court acted well 
within its discretion in determining that Waters' testimony would have been 
cumulative and irrelevant. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The relevancy of evidence is an issue of law subject to free review. 
v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764, 864 P.2d 596, 602 (1993). A district court's 
decision to exclude evidence pursuant to I.R.E. 403 will be disturbed on appeal 
only if the appellant demonstrates that the district court abused its discretion 
State v. Birk/a, 126 Idaho 498, 500, 887 P.2d 43, 45 (Ct. App. 1994). 
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C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Discretion In Declining To Allow 
Potential Defense Witness Candice Waters To Testify 
Evidence is relevant if it has a tendency to make more or less likely any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action. I.R.E. 401. Idaho 
Rule of Evidence 403 gives the district court discretion to exclude even relevant 
evidence whose probative value is substantially outweighed by, among other 
things, considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
At trial, after the state rested, Fortin's counsel informed the court that 
Fortin would not be testifying, and that he would not be calling any witnesses. 
· (5/19/10 Tr., p.93, Ls.7-23; p.97, L.5 - p.99, L.9.) However, before the defense 
formally rested, the district court took a break in the proceedings to settle the jury 
instructions. (5/19/10 Tr., p.99, Ls.10-14.) 
When the parties returned from the break, Fortin's defense counsel 
informed the court that Candice Waters, who was present at the Boise residence 
during the stabbing but was not called as a witness, informed him during the 
break that earlier, she had overheard state witnesses Darryl Shaylor and Kasey 
Smith discussing their trial testimony after they had both testified. (5/19/10 Tr., 
p.101, L.16 - p.104, L.12.) Waters also told Fortin's defense counsel that she 
had had lunch with Shaylor earlier in the week, after Shaylor had testified. 
(5/19/10 Tr., p.103, Ls.19-24.) These acts, asserted Fortin, were in violation of 
the district court's admonishment to witnesses not to discuss their testimony. 
(5/19/10 Tr., p.104, Ls.1-8.) 
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The district court questioned Fortin's attorney as to the harm of such 
discussions, considering that Waters had not testified, and Shaylor and Smith 
had already testified at the time of the alleged discussions. (5/19/10 Tr., p.102, 
L7 - p.113, L. 17.) Fortin's counsel insisted that Waters had been tainted as a 
potential witness, though he did not offer any specific basis for any "taint." (Id.) 
Then, despite having informed the court, just minutes earlier, that the defense 
would not be calling any witnesses, Fortin attempted to call the now "tainted" 
Waters. (5/19/10 Tr., p.102, L. 17 - p.110, L.2.) The state objected, arguing that 
Fortin was "trying to do an end around of getting this testimony in front of the jury, 
for no other reason than of getting it in there when it's been no fact of 
consequence," and "trying to cause the problem by putting a witness on that's 
already spoke to a witness." (5/19/10 Tr., p.110, Ls.6-13.) 
The district court indicated that it would not allow Fortin to call Waters 
simply to introduce evidence that she had head Shaylor and/or Smith discussing 
their trial testimony, unless Fortin could substantiate his claim that Waters had 
actually been tainted as a potential witness to Fortin's detriment. (5/19/10 Tr., 
p.103, L.7 p.113, L.17.) Fortin then attempted to theorize an alternative basis 
to call Waters as a witness. Fortin gave an offer of proof that Waters would 
testify that she was at the house the night of the stabbing, she did not see Fortin 
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punch Shaylor outside the house,3 and that after the incident, Fortin accidentally 
went to Waters' car and Waters had to redirect him to his own car.4 (5/19/10 Tr., 
p.114, L.4 - p.116, L.24.) The district court ruled this proposed evidence was 
"not exculpatory," and was "cumulative," and "irrelevant." (5/19/10 Tr., p.116, 
L.25 - p.118, L.6.) The district court declined to allow Fortin to call Waters, and 
the defense rested. (Id.; 5/19/10 Tr., p.119, Ls.1-4.) 
On appeal, Fortin raises additional justifications for the admission of 
Waters' testimony. Fortin argues that because some of the state witnesses' 
testimony was inconsistent regarding the events of the night of the stabbing, 
Waters' own account could not possibly be needlessly cumulative. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.18-21.) Fortin also asserts that Waters would have testified that she did 
not see Fortin stab Shaylor outside the house. (Appellant's brief, p.19.) 
This Court should not consider any of Fortin's additional justifications for 
Waters' testimony beyond what was presented to the district court in Fortin's 
3 When the district court inquired as to whether Waters may simply not have 
been in a position to see Fortin punch Shaylor outside the house, or whether 
Shaylor was in position to see a punch had it occurred, Fortin acknowledged that 
"I believe her testimony was, to me, that she didn't see him throw a punch, but 
maybe it could have happened." (5/19/10 Tr., p.115, Ls.5-11.) The court relied, 
in part, on this distinction in excluding the evidence. (5/19/10 Tr., p.117, Ls.4-
14.) It is possible, from this context, and the weight the court appears to have 
put on this distinction, that the district court construed the proposed evidence that 
"Waters didn't see Fortin punch Shaylor outside," as "Waters didn't see Fortin 
stab Shaylor outside." 
4 In his appellant's brief, Fortin explains that this evidence was relevant because 
the jury heard testimony that Fortin approached Candice's car after the stabbing, 
and "they could have been left with the impression that Mr. Fortin was trying to 
attack Candice as well," if not for Waters' testimony that Fortin approaching 
Waters' car was merely an accident. (Appellant's brief, p.20.) 
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offer of proof. The district court did not consider such additional justifications in 
precluding Waters' testimony. Instead, Fortin offered the district court only 
unspecified accusations of witness taint, and irrelevant or cumulative evidence. 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this testimony. 
Fortin further contends that the district court erred in requiring him to 
present an offer of proof for Waters' testimony in the first place, contending that 
"that is what the trial is for." (Appellant's brief, p.20.) Fortin offers no authority or 
additional argument to support the claim that the district court may never require 
a party to make an offer of proof before calling a witness. 
To the contrary, the Idaho Rules of Evidence grant district courts the 
authority to manage a trial, and to prevent trials from becoming embroiled in 
collateral matters. I.R.E. 403, 611 (a); see also State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30, 41, 
752 P.2d 632, 643 (Ct. App. 1988) (Burnett, J., specially concurring). In light of 
the circumstances surrounding Fortin's attempt to call Waters as a witness in this 
case, it was within the court's discretion to require Fortin to present an offer of 
proof as to the content of Waters' testimony. The circumstances suggest that 
Fortin's purpose in attempting to call Waters as a witness was to then argue that 
Waters' testimony had been "tainted." Such an argument would have been both 
illogical, and unfairly prejudicial to the state. Fortin has not been able to explain, 
either below or on appeal, how Shaylor's and Smith's apparent discussion of 
their trial testimony could have possibly "tainted" Waters' proposed testimony to 
Fortin's determinant. In fact, Fortin argues on appeal that Waters' proposed 
testimony would have been "favorable to the defense." (Appellant's brief, p.20). 
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The district court acted within its discretion in requiring Fortin to give an 
offer of proof that Waters would either provide some substance to a legitimate 
"witness taint" claim, or at least provide evidence relevant to the case. Fortin 
provided neither, and the district court acted within its discretion to exclude the 
testimony. 
D. Any Error In Excluding Waters' Testimony Was Harmless 
Where an error concerns evidence improperly excluded at trial, the test for 
harmless error is whether there is a reasonable probably that the lack of the 
excluded evidence contributed to the verdict. State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 
197, 16 P.3d 288, 294 (Ct. App. 2000). In this case, even if the district court 
erred in excluding Waters' testimony, there is no reasonable probability that such 
error contributed to the verdict. 
The evidence at trial was overwhelming that Fortin twice stabbed Shaylor 
with a knife at the Boise residence, and suffered significant injuries. The 
attending trauma surgeon testified and described Shaylor's injuries as being 
caused by puncture wounds consistent with a stabbing by knife, and inconsistent 
with an accidental fall against a desk or entertainment center. (5/18/10 Tr., 
p.162, L.7- p.171, L.14.) While the testimony of the state's witnesses regarding 
who saw what, and who, if anyone, was using alcohol, marijuana, or 
metharnphetamine the night of the stabbing was not entirely consistent, there is 
overwhelming evidence that Fortin, and Fortin alone, stabbed Shaylor both in the 
chest, and face. Multiple witnesses described the altercation between Fortin and 
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Shaylor (5/17/10 Tr., p.10, L.8 - p.19, L.12; p.53, L.20 - p.59, L.17; 5/18/10 Tr., 
p.38, L.9 - p.48, L.23; p.72, L.24 - p.79, L.15; p.104, L.12 - p.110, L.12), and 
none testified that anyone else was physically involved in the confrontation. The 
district court did not instruct the jury on self-defense, and presumably, Fortin did 
not request such an instruction. (5/19/10 Tr., p.119, L.8 - p.129, L.9.) There is 
no reasonable probability that the jury would have acquitted Fortin if Waters had 
testified that she did not see Fortin punch or stab Shaylor outside the house, or if 
Fortin were permitted to argue that this testimony was somehow "tainted" by 
Shaylor and Smith. Any district court error in excluding Waters' testimony is thus 
harmless. 
111. 
Fortin Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion For A 
Mistrial 
A. Introduction 
Fortin contends that the district court erred in dismissing his motion for a 
mistrial after state witness Darryl Shaylor referenced Fortin's gang affiliation on 
cross-examination. (Appellant's brief, pp.21-24.) A review of the record, 
however, reveals that Shaylor simply gave a responsive answer to a question 
posed by Fortin's defense counsel, and that no pretrial court order precluded 
such a reference or ordered the state to admonish witnesses to avoid such 
references. Further, the fleeting and isolated reference was not so egregious as 
to require a mistrial. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion for mistrial, the 
question on appeal is not whether the district court reasonably exercised its 
discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial motion was made. 
State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 197, 16 P.3d 288, 294 (Ct. App. 2000). The 
question is whether the event which precipitated the motion for mistrial 
represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the full record. Id. 
Thus, where a motion for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the abuse 
of discretion standard is a misnomer. kl The district court's refusal to declare a 
mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted 
reversible error. Id. 
C. The District Court Did Not Err In Denying Fortin's Motion For A Mistrial 
During the defense's cross-examination of the victim, Darryl Shaylor, the 
following exchange occurred: 
Q: Now, at some point, I assume - did you ever get a clear look 
at this knife? It seems you like - you just say it was a shiny 
object. 
A: Not a clear look, but I believe getting cut across the face and 
stabbed in the neck and seeing a shine, you know it's a 
knife. 
Q: So it's just your opinion that this was a knife? 
A: I knew it was a knife. I couldn't determine which kind. 
Q: How do you know it was a knife? 
A: Because it punctured me in the neck and cut me across the 
face, and I know most gang members carry those. 
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(5/17/10 Tr., p.30, Ls.12-24.) 
The district court immediately instructed the jury to disregard Shaylor's 
reference to gang members. (5/17/10 Tr., p.31, Ls.2-4.) Shaylor completed his 
testimony, and at the next break in the trial proceedings, Fortin moved for a 
mistrial, arguing that Shaylor's reference to gang members was "too 
inflammatory for a curative instruction." (5/17/10 Tr., p.41, L.9- p.44, L.13.) 
Fortin expressly acknowledged that the state did not plant or otherwise invite the 
comment from Shaylor. (5/17/10 Tr., p.46, Ls.9-14.) 
The district court denied the motion for a mistrial. (5/17/10 Tr., p.46, L.15 
- p.48, L.7.) The court recognized that there had been no motion in limine 
requesting a pretrial order instructing the state to admonish witnesses from 
referencing gang membership regardless of the questions they were asked. 
(5/17/10 Tr., p.42, Ls.1-5; p.46, L.25 p.47, L.4.) Further, the court recognized 
that Fortin's open-ended cross-examination question, "how do you know it was a 
knife?" invited any range of responses from Shaylor, not all necessarily beneficial 
to Fortin's defense. The court explained: 
In my view and my opinion, if you ask an open-ended question on 
cross-examination such as how or why, the witness is entitled to tell 
you how, and if that's on his mind, why you've got it. If there's 
something in that explanation that you want to build a fence around 
it, then, either, A, ask precise questions, or, B, you have to alert in 
advance with a motion in limine. 
(5/17/10 Tr., p.47, Ls.16-22.) 
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The district court further indicated that it would entertain a request for 
additional jury instruction regarding the gang reference, but Fortin declined to 
make such a request. (5/17/10 Tr., p.48, Ls.1-10.) 
The district court's analysis was correct. Fortin's cross-examination 
question was open-ended and invited a wide range of possible responses from 
Shaylor. Without any pretrial order requiring the state to admonish witnesses not 
to include references to gang membership in their answers regardless of the 
questions they are asked, defense counsel opens the door to potentially 
prejudicial topics with such questions. A district court is not required to grant a 
motion for a mistrial in such circumstances. 
The prosecutor did state to the district court he was "pretty sure" that prior 
to trial, he advised Shaylor that gang membership or activity was "not to be 
mentioned unless you're asked a question that calls for it, and that you cannot lie 
if asked a question." (5/17/10 Tr., p.45, Ls.13-17.) On appeal, Fortin argues that 
this comment reveals that Shaylor's reference to gangs was not a "valid answer 
based on stream of consciousness thinking," but was an intentional act by 
Shaylor to "tak[eJ advantage of the open ended question to inject prejudicial 
information to the jury." (Appellant's brief, p.23.) 
Even if it could be assumed that Shaylor was so savvy, Fortin's logic is 
flawed. Shaylor admitted that he did not get a "clear look" at the knife, but 
believed it to be a knife because he had been stabbed and cut across the face 
with it. (5/17/10 Tr., p.30, Ls.12-17.) The response was not satisfactory to 
Fortin's counsel, who pressed Shaylor on the issue and again asked him how he 
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knew that it was a knife. (5/17/10 Tr., p.30, Ls.18-21.) Only then did Shaylor 
offer an additional, responsive answer, that he knew "most gang members carry 
those." (5/17/10 Tr., p.30, Ls.21-24.) Despite Fortin's contention on appeal, it is 
reasonable for someone who has experienced the infliction of a puncture wound 
at the hands a member of a group known to carry knives, to believe that he was 
in fact, stabbed with a knife, as opposed to some other object. 
Further, Fortin's reference to Shaylor's apparent gang membership was 
not so egregious as to constitute "reversible error" and require a mistrial. The 
comment was brief, and constituted an isolated incident. Shaylor provided no 
basis for how he might have known Fortin was associated with a gang. Such 
evidence was thus less prejudicial then if, for example, a police officer 
affirmatively testified that the defendant was, in fact, a gang member. The district 
court immediately instructed the jury to disregard Shaylor's comment (5/17/10 
Tr., p.31, Ls.2-4), and "[e]rror in the admission of evidence may be cured by 
proper instruction, and it must be presumed that the jury obeyed the trial court's 
direction to disregard entirely the objectional testimony." State v. Boothe, 103 
Idaho 187, 646 P.2d 429 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Because Shaylor gave a responsive answer to Fortin's open-ended cross-
examination question, no pretrial order prohibited such an answer, and because 
Shaylor's reference to Fortin's gang affiliation was brief and immediately stricken 
by the district court, Fortin has failed to show that the reference represented 
reversible error requiring the district court to declare a mistrial. 
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IV. 
Fortin Has Failed To Show That There Was More Than One Preserved Error To 
Cumulate 
Fortin finally contends that errors in his trial constituted cumulative error. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.24-25.) Under the cumulative error doctrine, an 
accumulation of irregularities, each of which in itself might be harmless, may in 
the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. Missamore, 119 Idaho 
27, 32, 803 P.2d 528, 533 (1990). However, because Fortin has failed to show 
error, much less multiple errors, this doctrine is inapplicable. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Fortin's conviction for 
aggravated battery and the deadly weapon sentencing enhancement. 
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